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THE VALUATION OF AN EXPERIENCE: A
STUDY IN LAND USE REGULATION

BOB MADDEN*

Imagine Congress has just passed legislation, the Lewis and
Clark Route Restoration Act, and that the President has signed it
into law.' The Act requires restoring the entire route used by
Lewis and Clark in their journey from St. Louis to the Pacific
Ocean.' Under this new legislation, St. Louis will be restored to its
1804 form, the year Lewis and Clark departed on their journey.'
The restoration will include removing all modern pavement along
the route. In addition, any objects that did not exist at the time of
the expedition, such as electrical wires, will be removed from the
route in order to restore it to its appearance in the early 1800s.4
* J.D. Candidate, June 2004.

The author wishes the thank Professor Susan

Connor, J.D., and Professor Celeste Hammond, J.D., for their invaluable
guidance and direction, Todd Murphy and Brian Holt for their superb editorial
inputs, and my wife Kathy for her astute proofreading. This comment is
dedicated to our parents, whose accommodations have made my time in law
school possible.
1. Although the Lewis and Clark Route Restoration Act is only
hypothetical, similar laws do exist in the United States. See National Trails
System Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 1244(a)(6) (2000) (creating the category of
National Historic Trails, and designating the Lewis and Clark Trail as one of
four new National Historic Trails).
See also, Lewis & Clark Heritage
Foundation, Inc., The History of the Lewis & Clark Expedition, at
http://www.lewisandclark.org/history.htm
(last visited April 15, 2003)
[hereinafter Lewis & Clark Foundation] (describing the historic Lewis and
Clark expedition originating near Wood River, Illinois, and following the route
to the mouth of the Columbia River in Oregon).
2. ALF J. MAPP, JR., THOMAS JEFFERSON PASSIONATE PILGRIM: THE
PRESIDENCY, THE FOUNDING OF THE UNIVERSITY, AND THE PRIVATE BATTLE
128-29 (Madison Books 1991). On May 14, 1804, twenty-three men, including
Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, left St. Louis, then a frontier settlement
and fur trading center, and made their way up the Missouri River. Id.
Crossing the Continental Divide in what is now Montana, they eventually
moved down the Columbia River, and on November 15, 1806, came into view
of the Pacific Ocean. Id. at 129.
3. Id.
4. See JEAN COOKE, HISTORY'S TIMELINE (Fay Franklin ed., Barnes and
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The legislation bans all vehicles, including trains and airplanes,
from the area so as not to pollute the route with sounds not heard
in 1804 and 1805.'
Tourists experiencing the route will be
transported via a perfectly silent electric train system utilizing
state of the art technology, allowing the train to blend into the
surrounding scenery.
The recent public resurgence of patriotism, resulting in
renewed public interest in American history, is the motivation
behind this legislation. Based on the renewed public interest,
Congress concluded that the experience of the Lewis and Clark
adventure has significant public benefits that exceed the benefits
derived from the modern infrastructure currently in existence
along the route.6
This hypothetical represents an exaggerated exercise of
governmental power. However, analyzed in its component parts,
many of the issues presented by the hypothetical act have been
litigated and resolved in United States courts.7
Noble Books 1996) (indicating that there were no electrical wires present in
the early 1800s). The electric telegraph was patented by inventor Samuel
Morse in 1840. Id. at 168.
5. Trains, automobiles, and airplanes, like electrical wires, would not have
existed in the early 1800s. The first practical and mobile steam engine was
built in England in 1813, followed by a passenger line in 1825. Id. at 162.
Railway operations in North America began within the next ten years. Id.
Karl Benz marketed a petrol-powered car in 1888, dubbed to have been the
motor industry's start. Id. at 176. The Wright brothers conducted the first
successful powered, manned flight of a heavier-than-air machine at
Kittyhawk, North Carolina in 1903. Id. at 188. The flight lasted for twelve
seconds and covered a distance of 120 feet. Id.
6. See 16 U.S.C. § 1241 (2000) (describing the purpose of the national trail
system as preservation of outdoor historic resources and scenic historic travel
routes).
7. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
535 U.S 302, 319-321 (2002) (describing cases involving: governmental actions
found to be condemnations; regulatory takings requiring compensation; and
regulations that did not require governmental compensation).
In the
hypothetical Lewis and Clark legislation, the taking of all the buildings and
streets in St. Louis for the purpose of restoring them to their vintage state
would require the government to exercise its power of eminent domain. See
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (holding that legislation
allowing the taking of private property and transferring ownership of it to
other private parties was constitutional if the transfer served a public
purpose). Removal of the modern intrusions along the route would probably
fall under the category of zoning regulation. See Village of Euclid v. Amber
Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (holding that government can control private
land use through the police power). Ridding the route of noise-producing
modern contraptions (other than the Expedition Train in which the
'experiencers" will be riding) could be accomplished by using public nuisance
laws. See, e.g., United States v. Atlantic-Richfield, 478 F. Supp 1215, 1220 (D.
Mont. 1979) (holding that federal statute had not eliminated the federal
common law regulating nuisance, and that the government could sue for a
court order to have the defendants reduce the emissions of fluoride being
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The Supreme Court has recognized that, while the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution authorizes
governmental takings of private property, it also requires the
government to provide compensation to the property owners.8 The
Court has held that the language of the Fifth Amendment
distinguishes between physical takings and regulatory takings.9
Thus, a "taking" may occur either through eminent domain or by
the over-regulation of property. The issue that gives rise to
litigation is over what constitutes just compensation.
Compensation rarely includes any reimbursement to property
owners for the value of their experience associated with the
ownership of land-only the market value of the land. In addition,
if a court determines a regulation affecting land use is not a
taking, a landowner may lose, without compensation, the
experiential value of land ownership.
This Comment will demonstrate that the valuation of
experiences is important, and that the current laws do not
adequately address the issues surrounding valuation of an
experience. ° Two major problems result from this failure. First,
private landowners can be forced to bear an unfair burden of the
cost of land use decisions. Second, the public loses because
resources may be squandered and their value exploited by a few,
at the public's expense.
Part I of this Comment will introduce the general concepts
involved in governmental takings and other land use regulation.
It will also describe the general authority for and the limitations of
these actions. Part II will analyze the methods of valuation and
the remedies that have been applied in these actions. It will also
discuss why these methods are inadequate in the valuation of an
Part III will explain why the valuation of an
experience.
experience is important. Finally, Part IV will propose valuation
methods intended to more appropriately and precisely value
experiences associated with land use.

I.

PRINCIPLES IN PROPERTY AND LAND USE REGULATION

A. Common Definitions of Property
One problem in valuation of experiences associated with land
use is the variety of definitions associated with property. Most
everyone, whether a lawyer, a factory worker, or the kid next door,
emptied into the waterway from their plant).
8. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 321.
9. Id.
10. See Douglas 0. Linder, New Directionfor PreservationLaw: Creatingan
Environment Worth Experiencing, 20 ENVTL. L. 49, 70 (1990) (discussing why
experiences are important and why current legal and political doctrines do not
adequately address their recognition and protection).
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believes that they understand the definition of property. However,
the term has many different meanings." A layperson would likely
define property as something tangible that is owned by a natural
person, a corporation, or a unit of the government."
This
definition confuses the physical manifestation with the subject
matter of property, and fails to acknowledge that property may be
an intangible, non-physical thing. 3
From a legal perspective, property is not a thing, 4 but the
range of entitlements to the use or benefit of assets, including the
use and enjoyment of land and physical resources." The subject
matter of property includes land, chattels, or intangible things. 6
In Anglo-American law, property in land is classified as "real
property" while chattels and intangible things are "personal
property."17 For example, a child may claim that his parents own
the house they live in and the yard surrounding it, because
ownership to the child is generally equated with possession of the
property.' 8 He may be unaware that his parents are only renting
the house, or that they may have bought the house but have a
large mortgage, in which case the lending institution would also
have an ownership interest in the property. 9 As evidenced by

11. See WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 887 (Houghton Mifflin
Co. 1995).
Property is defined as "1. Ownership. 2.a. A possession. b.
Possessions as a whole. 3. Something tangible of intangible to which its owner
holds legal title. . . ." Id. Property is legally defined as "all a person's legal

rights, of whatever description.., property includes not all a person's rights,
but only his proprietary as opposed to his personal rights." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1232 (7th ed. 1999) Black's definition lists thirty-two types of
named property, including intangible property, intellectual property, personal

property and real property. Id. at 1233-34.
12.

WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 1

(West Group, 3d ed. 2000).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. JACK
L.
KNETSCH,
PROPERTY
RIGHTS
AND
COMPENSATION,
COMPULSORY ACQUISITION AND OTHER LOSSES 1 (Butterworths 1983).

16. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 12, at 10.
17. Id. Intangible things relating to personal property include claims to
bank accounts, promissory notes, bonds, corporate stock, life insurance policies
and annuities, patents, copyrights, trademarks, and goodwill of a business.

Id. at 10-11.
18. See id. at 5 (stating that one is said to be the owner of a thing when one
has "complete property" or the totality of rights, privileges, powers and
immunities that are legally possible, in a thing). However, a person is said to
be the owner even when their interests in the thing do not add up to the
totality of the complete property. Id. A person is commonly termed to be the
owner of land or an automobile despite the fact that there may be other
parties who hold an interest in the land or automobile respectively, through
mechanisms such as mortgages, liens, or easements. Id.
19. See id. (stating that a person who has a property interest such as a
leasehold or an easement may properly be said to either "own" or "to have" the
particular leasehold or easement).
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these often used and cited definitions, one can ascertain that many
views of property do not encompass the value of experiences
associated with the land and its use. This places these experiences
at risk of being undervalued, or overlooked completely.
B. Laws Regulating PropertyRights
Property owners' legal rights are defined by legislation,
regulations, court rulings, and societies' customs and traditions. °
These rights are not static; rather, they change through the action
of legislatures, administrative agencies, courts and other
institutions."' In addition, society's values influence and shape
these rights even though, in some instances, the owner may not
share these values.22 This fact sets the stage for the undervaluing
of a property owner's experience.
Current legal doctrines address the basic aspects of property
ownership, such as the right of the government to seize private
property or regulate the owner's use of that property. For
example, the Fifth Amendment authorizes the government to take
possession of real property from the private landowner through a
process called eminent domain.22
In other instances, the
government may choose to regulate the use of real property by
preventing the owner from performing a particular act on his land
because it is considered a nuisance.24 Zoning regulations also limit
20. KNETSCH, supra note 15, at 1.
21. Id.

22. See id. at 1-2 (stating that the interests of the owner and of the
community may not be entirely congruent).
23. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 12, at 524. The power of eminent
domain is granted to the federal government by the Fifth Amendment's
"Takings Clause". It states, "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend V (emphasis added). The
government's powers of eminent domain are limited by the terms of the
amendment itself, namely "public use" and "just compensation." STOEBUCK &
WHITMAN, supra note 12, at 524-25. Until Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367,
373-74 (1875), the federal government customarily asked that the states
condemn any land for federal government use. Id. at 525 n.1. In fact, most
states have language similar to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment as
part of their own constitutions. Id. However, the United States Supreme
Court made it clear in Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), that the
states eminent domain power is restricted through the Due Process Clause of
the 14th Amendment. STOEBUCK & WILLIAM, supra note 12, at 525 n.2.
24. Id. at 418. Nuisance law deals with the freedom of a party entitled to
possession of land to use and enjoy certain rights associated with that
possession. Id. at 410. Typical nuisances are caused by, but not limited to,
noise, dust, smoke, odors, vermin, insects and vibrations. Id. at 413-14.
Causation of a nuisance is a tort, but it is distinguished from trespass in that
a trespass involves a physical invasion of the possessor's land, while a
nuisance generally does not involve invasion of the land by a human entity.
Id. at 414. A nuisance occurs when a party maintains a condition on his land
that unreasonably interferes with a plaintiffs use and enjoyment of the
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how a property owner uses his or her own property."
In the case of a taking through eminent domain, the taking
must be justified by a public use, and compensation is generally
the fair market value of the property taken. 6 The Supreme Court
has established clear rules governing the power of eminent
domain. 7 The Court has stated that a taking is generally
undisputed when the government condemns or physically
appropriates the property. 8 A private landowner may disagree
with the level of compensation provided through an eminent
domain proceeding because, as explained in Part II, the fair
market value does not include the subjective value that the owner
associates with the experience of owning the land.
To justify a regulatory taking, the government must be
exercising its police power to protect the health, safety and welfare
of its citizens. 9 A regulation is deemed to be a taking, and thus
requires compensation "when either (1) it does not substantially
advance a legitimate state interest; or (2) it denies the owner
economically viable use of her land." ° While easy to articulate,
applying the test often requires a complex analysis."
This
purpose
assessment
of
both
the
determination requires a factual

plaintiffs land. Id.
25. See Village of Belle Terre v. Borras, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) (holding that a
New York village ordinance, restricting the use of land to one-family
dwellings, was constitutional). Historically, zoning was primarily utilized to
control public nuisances. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 12, at 575. In
the United States, during the colonial period, municipalities would enact
regulations banning to the outskirts of town activities described as "noisome."
Id. Noisome activities included slaughterhouses, gunpowder mills and other
similar activities. Id.
26. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 12, at 539.
27. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 321-22. See Kohl, 91 U.S. at
372 (establishing that the federal government can condemn land on its own
accord without forcing the states to do the condemnation for them).
28. Tahoe-SierraPres. Council, 535 U.S. 322.
29. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN, 107-08 (Harv. Univ. Press 1985). The Constitution does

not contain the words "police power", but it is understood to be the grant of
those powers to the state governments that are not explicitly limited by the
United States Constitution. Id. at 107. The scope of the police power being
limited to public safety, health, moral and welfare issues is attributed to
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). Id. at 108. See EPSTEIN, at 10809 (quoting Constr. Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 906 (9th
Cir. 1975), as a modern, more pallid definition of police power allowing
rejection of zoning ordinance challenges). The modern formulation allows
rejection of challenges when the ordinance "bears any rational relationship to
a legitimate state interest." Id. Unfortunately for many challengers of the
government's police power, this standard is almost always met. Id. at 109.
30. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 314 (quoting the district court's
decision and recognition of the Supreme Court decision in Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
31. Tahoe-SierraPres. Council, 535 U.S. 321-22.
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and the economic effects of the action.32
Although a regulation that is not a taking requires no
compensation, the regulation must nonetheless be justified by one
of the police powers.3 Zoning and nuisance laws are examples of
justified regulations that may not constitute a taking. Zoning laws
are justified as legitimate governmental exercises in the
regulation of private land use.34 However, when the purpose of the
zoning law is the preservation of an aesthetic preference or a view,
the justification is less clear. 35 Nuisance law has also been
justified as a governmental regulation of land use.36 Zoning and
nuisance laws may regulate a private landowner without
compensation, in a manner that reduces or destroys the experience
associated with his or her ownership of the land.
C. Allocation of Costs and Benefits
When landowners are compensated for eminent domain
takings, in theory, they have not suffered a loss because they can

32. See id. at 323 (quoting Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992), the
opinion gives a list of cases exemplifying when governmental actions are and
are not takings). For example, when the government takes possession of an
interest in property, it has a duty to compensate the former owner. Id. (citing
United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 113, 115 (1951)). This applies
regardless of whether the entire parcel is taken, or whether only a portion of
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. 323. The
the parcel is taken.
government continues to have a duty to compensate the owner, even when the
taking is temporary. Id. (citing United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S.
373 (1945)). Id. A taking will also occur if the government appropriates part
of a rooftop to mount a TV cable. Id. (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)). Takings even are experienced
when planes use private airspace to approach a government airport. Id.
In all these
(citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
circumstances, and many similar to them, the government must pay for the
use. Id. at 322-23. In contrast, the case cites examples where governmental
action is not a taking. For example, the following government actions were
not takings according to the United States Supreme Court: (1) a government
regulation that prohibited landlords from evicting tenants because the tenant
was unwilling to pay higher rent, Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); (2) a
ban on certain uses of private property in a residential area as other than
family homes, Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 365; and (3) a regulation
concerning historic preservation which prevented the landowners from
constructing a multi story addition above the owner's train station. Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
33. EPSTEIN, supra note 29, at 108.
34. See Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 396-97 (holding that government can
control private land use through the police power).
35. KNETSCH, supra note 15, at 117-18. The trade-off between a view and
the activities that block that view are important and fragile because they
depend on neighboring property owners. Id. However, in most jurisdictions,
views are not afforded much protection. Id. at 119.
36. BARLOW BURKE ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PROPERTY LAW 184-85

(1999).
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replace the land with a suitable equivalent by using the fair
market value received for the land taken.37 When a regulation is
less than a taking38 the landowner is completely burdened with the
cost imposed by the regulation.39 For example, a regulation
limiting the height of apartment buildings will prevent a
landowner from earning greater rental income by limiting the
number of units that can be built on that particular parcel of
land.40
Other common examples exist in which a regulation allocates
the entire cost to the landowner without compensation. Many
statutes declare private property to be historic landmarks.4' Such
statutes force the landowner to maintain the site in its current
condition.
When these statutes are enforced without
compensation to the landowners, they bestow a benefit onto the
public at a potentially tremendous cost to the landowner.42
Furthermore, even when compensation is required, intangible
matters such as aesthetics or views are generally not considered
valuable by the law.43 Unless they are associated with other
factors such as public health or safety, they are generally not

37. See KNETSCH, supra note 15, at 39 (stating that there is a presumption
that a compensated party is no worse off after the exchange than before
because they can purchase an equivalent replacement).
38. See supra Part II.C (discussing regulatory non-takings).
39. See EPSTEIN, supra note 29, at 269-72 (discussing Haas v. City of San
Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117 (9th Cir 1979)). The author notes the Ninth Circuit's
holding that an ordinance restricting construction on Russian Hill, which
caused a significant economic loss to the landowner, was not a taking. Id. at
1118. The author also discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Agins, 447
U.S. at 272-73 (1980), holding that the landowner is benefited by the
ordinance and is not the only property affected by a regulation that limits the
number of homes to five that could be built on his five acre plot. Id.
40. Haas, 605 F.2d at 1121.
41. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 12, at 689-90.

42. See id. at 693 (discussing Rebman v. City of Springfield, 250 N.E.2d 282
(Ill. App. Ct. 1969). The Rebman court rejected a takings claim by property
owners in a four-block historic district, declared in the area around the
Abraham Lincoln home, and thus preventing the property owners from
utilizing the property for commercial purposes. Rebman, 250 N.E.2d at 286.
Another drastic example of an uncompensated burden placed on a private
landowner can be found in Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 104. In Penn
Central, the Court held New York's historic preservation ordinance, restricting
the owners of Grand Central Station from building additional offices above the
station, was constitutional and not a taking. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at
138. The landowners were deprived of the additional income and required to
maintain the building in its current state. Id.
43. KNETSCH, supra note 15, at 119 (stating that loss of a view is generally
not compensable). However, there is an exception to this, where compensation
may be paid by the buyer of a part of an owner's parcel and the loss of a view
in the remaining owner's parcel results in a decrease in property value after
that acquisition. Id.
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viewed as having any fair market value." Thus, regulations
depriving a landowner of aesthetic pleasure associated with
property could occur with no compensation.45 Although there is a
trend toward recognizing aesthetics as a valid exercise of police
power in its own right, the acceptance is not yet universal.46
Providing a value for the experiences associated with land
ownership could impact a large number of people when regulations
Governmental condemnation and
govern public land use.
regulation of public lands both grant and withdraw rights
associated with property use for many people. Furthermore, the
allocation of the benefits of land regulation is of great interest to
the community at large.47
There are cases that provide interesting scenarios as to how
the courts have reacted to issues concerning the valuation of those
things that are amorphous and indeterminable.48 For example,
courts have wrestled with the issue of how to value the view
overlooking a historic battlefield sight, weighed against the value
of the rights of adjacent landowners to use their land to construct
a tower overlooking the sight. The tower, which was open to the
public for a fee, had obvious educational value, but also disrupted
the scene's historic nature.49 Courts have also weighed the value
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Temple Baptist Church, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 646 P.2d 565 (N.M.
1982). The Supreme Court of New Mexico, in ruling on the constitutionality of
a sign ordinance, stated that although some jurisdictions reject aesthetics
alone as a justification of an exercise of police power, a better rule of law is for
aesthetic considerations alone to justify exercise of a police action. Id. at 571.
However, the court pointed out that until recently, aesthetics alone was not a
sufficient justification for the exercise of police powers, and that other
jurisdictions are split on the issue. Id. at 570.
47. KNETSCH, supranote 15, at 118.
48. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 312 (challenging a
temporary moratorium on development surrounding Lake Tahoe in an effort
to preserve the water's clarity). See also Hells Canyon Alliance v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 227 F.3d 1170, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2000) (challenging regulations over the
use of Hells Canyon Recreational Area in suits initiated by motorized and nonmotorized water craft users having competing interest in the use of the area);
Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition v. FAA, 154 F.3d 455, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(challenging the FAA's regulation of overflights of the Grand Canyon by
private aircraft).
49. Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d 588,
589-90 (Pa. 1973). Gettysburg National Park in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania has
been the subject of litigation with regard to its historic preservation and its
scenic views. Id. Pennsylvania brought an action to enjoin the construction of
a 307-foot tower overlooking the battlefield. Id. at 590. The National Park
Service had already negotiated an agreement with the defendants, who were
the landowners. Id. at 589. The defendants agreed to convey certain land to
the Park Service in exchange for permission to build an observation tower that
would overlook the battlefield from an alternate site. Id. at 590. The
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, acting as the plaintiff in the case, objected to
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of lake clarity against the value of housing developments that
threatened the lake's pristine state." Courts have also been asked
to resolve a dispute involving the value of quietly experiencing the
Grand Canyon, weighed against the value of experiencing an
airplane ride over this stunning natural feature. 51

this agreement, stating that the proposed tower at the alternate site would be
detrimental to the historic, scenic, and aesthetic aspects of the area. Id. at
590. The plaintiff produced witnesses who testified that the presence of the
tower would be a serious detriment the historic battlefield. Id. at 590. The
defendants countered with witnesses who testified that the tower would be
aesthetically pleasing, unobtrusive, and of great educational value. Id. at 590.
The opinion points out that, as owners of the land on which the tower was to
be built, the defendants were free to use the property as they wished, as long
as they did not interfere with the reasonable enjoyment of their neighbor's
property, subject to regulations of the state through its police power. Id. at
589. These rights are protected under Article I, §§ 1 & 10 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Id.
The court held that that there were no applicable zoning regulations
governing the construction of towers, and no Pennsylvania statue authorized
the Governor or the Attorney General to initiate this type of lawsuit. Id. at
589. The Commonwealth based its position on the Pennsylvania State
Constitution, Article 1, § 27, which states that the people of the state have a
right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of historic and aesthetic
values in the environment. Id. at 591-92. The Commonwealth alleged that
this amendment was self-executing and that no additional legislation was
required in order to vest these rights in the people. Id. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that if the amendment was selfexecuting, a property owner would not know, other than through expensive
litigation, what he could and could not do with his property. Id. at 593. The
court stated that, under the circumstances, such a self-executing amendment
'would pose serious problems of constitutionality, under both the equal
protection clause and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. The court held that, in order to make the amendment effective,
supplemental legislation defining the protected values needed to be enacted.
Id. at 594. The legislation also needed to establish fair procedures for
regulating the use of private property. Id.
50. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 308 (stating that the blue
color and clarity of Lake Tahoe is being threatened by the development of land
around the lake).
51. Grand Canyon Air, 154 F.3d at 459. In August 1987, Congress passed
the Overflights Act, which required the FAA to create one or more locations
where visitors to the Grand Canyon would be free from the distraction of
aircraft noise. Id. at 459-60. The stated purpose of the Act was to allow
visitors to the Grand Canyon to enjoy a quiet "experience," free from the
buzzing noise of planes and other aircraft. Id. Groups such as the Grand
Canyon Air Tour Coalition, whose members provide tour flights over the
Grand Canyon, challenged the establishment of no flight zones by the FAA.
Id. at 464. The Air Coalition argued that the statute did not intend to
authorize the elimination of noise, but was intended to increase the enjoyment
of people on the ground. Id. at 465. The court held that the Air Coalition
misread the intent of the Federal Register notice accompanying the final rule,
and that the intent of the statute was indeed to restore quiet to enhance the
visitors' experience. Id. at 465. Thus, this holding begs the question of
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Courts have also dealt with the use of public waterways by
incompatible types of watercrafts, 2 and with the construction of a
bridge providing access to a busy national park.53 These cases
whether the prohibition of the right of flight is a good tradeoff, if only a
handful of the public seek solitude from noise, while multitudes of people want
to experience the thrill of flying over the Grand Canyon.
52. Hells Canyon Alliance, 227 F.3d at 1172-73. In Hells Canyon Alliance,
Judge McKeown stated that "balancing the competing and often conflicting
interests of motorized water craft users, including jetboaters, and nonmotorized water craft users, such as rafters and kayakers, is no easy task."
Id. at 1173. The litigation surrounded the Forest Service's plans to implement
regulation of the Hells Canyon area in compliance with the Hells Canyon Act.
Id. The opinion notes that use of the area by both motorized and nonmotorized craft has soared between the 1970s and the 1990s. Id. The Forest
Service developed the Recreation Management Plan as a response to charges
that it had failed to regulate motorized watercraft in the Hells Canyon
National Recreation Area.
Id. In 1993, the agency released a draft
environmental impact statement, along with six alternatives for restricting or
complete elimination of motorized watercraft from the wild parts of the river.
Id. A seventh alternative, designated Alternative G, was ultimately selected,
which included motorized use level restrictions and three-day time windows
during which use of motorized watercraft was banned. Id. at 1173-74. The
plaintiffs opposed the implementation of the window and sued the Forest
Service, objecting to the implementation of the Recreational Management Plan
on several grounds. Id. at 1175. The court upheld the district court's grant of
summary judgment, thus upholding the Forest Service's implementation of
the Recreational Management Plan, and the subsequent restrictions on
motorized watercraft use. Id. at 1173. In doing so, the court rejected the
plaintiffs claim that the Forest Service's analysis of the window proposal was
inadequate. Id. at 1184.
53. Coalition for Canyon Pres., Inc., v. Hazen, 788 F. Supp. 1522 (1990).
Coalition for Canyon Pres. represents a useful example of the government's
struggle to balance various and conflicting public interests with regards to the
use of public lands. In 1988, the Red Bench Forest Fire destroyed a bridge
that crossed the North Fork of the Flathead River. Id. at 1523. The bridge
was a major access point to Glacier National Park. Id. The National Park
Service undertook an environmental assessment and found that
reconstructing the bridge in another location would have no significant
impacts. Id. At 1520. Because the bridge crossed a navigable stream, it was
necessary for the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) to apply to the
Corps of Engineers for a 404 permit under the Clean Water Act. Id. at 1524.
Based on the environmental impact study, the Corps issued the 404 permit,
and the Park Service issued a contract to Frontier West, a private contractor,
to begin construction of a new bridge. Id. The plaintiffs moved for a
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to stop construction
of the bridge. Id. Their case was based on seven violations, all related to the
issuance of the 404 permit. Id. at 1523. The plaintiffs' arguments were based
along two lines of reasoning. Id. First, plaintiffs argued that the location of
the new bridge, 350 feet upstream from the original site, would have a
significant impact on the wild and scenic river. Id. Second, plaintiffs argued
that the proposed two-lane bridge should be a one-lane bridge consistent with
the historic and natural qualities of the area. Id. The FHWA pointed out that
the bridge being used at the original bridge sight was a temporary structure,
and that halting construction of the new bridge would extend the use of the
temporary bridge exposing the public to a risk of bridge failure. Id. at 1524.
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demonstrate that courts can analyze and put a value on competing
interests involving more than the transfer of property, and that
cannot be evaluated on a purely monetary basis. In these cases,
the courts used factors other than fair market value to resolve the
disputes. The factors applied in these scenarios can be helpful in
understanding the problems associated with the valuation of an
experience.

II. EVALUATING CURRENT LEGAL DOCTRINES IN LAND USE AS A
GUIDE TO VALUING AN EXPERIENCE

The legal doctrines currently applied in land use regulation
present varying degrees of help in the valuation of experiences.
The doctrines associated with takings, regulatory non-takings,
nuisance law, and land use regulations are discussed below with
regards to their usefulness and shortfalls in the valuation of
experiences.
A. Valuation of Land in CondemnationActions
Condemnation takes the right of possession from the current
property owner and transfers it to another party, typically the
government.54
In exchange, the government is required to
compensate the landowner.55 Compensation is generally in the
form of payment to the owner for the fair market value of the
land.5" If the government only takes a partial interest in the land,
for example by condemnation for a roadway across a portion of an

The park department also testified as to having considered other concerns. Id.
Many issues were considered, including the (1) safety of the park employees'
children due to increased traffic on the original bridge leading into the Park
Service's residential and maintenance facilities, (2) minimizing the effect of
the bridge on the river by limiting the number of piers in the water and thus
minimizing obstructions to persons floating the river in the summer, and (3)
the need for the design of the new bridge to be sufficiently rustic so as to blend
with the area's natural and historic surroundings. Id. at 1526. The Park
Service coordinated with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
concerning the impact the bridge might have on threatened and endangered
species in the river. Id. The Park Service also called upon the Montana State
Historic preservation Officer to ascertain the impact that the bridge might
have on prehistoric sites in the area and its effect on any remaining sites
listed on the National Register for Historic Places and Sites. Id. The court
ultimately held that the defendants, "adequately ... considered the project in
light of the entire public interest," and that, "it would be a travesty on the
public interest to enjoin this project." Id. at 1530.
54. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 322 n.17 (stating that
condemnation or physical appropriation of property by the government is
typically an undisputed taking).
55. See id. at 322 (citing Pewee Coal as holding that there is a categorical
duty to compensate the former owner of property when the government takes
a property interest).
56. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 12, at 539.
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owner's land, the payment is based on the diminution in value of
the land that results from the burden. 7
Payment to the landowner is termed "eminent domain
compensation" 8 and is determined by the fair market value of land
based on what a willing person would pay the owner, as a willing
seller, for that parcel of land.59 However, this pricing method can
lead to some improprieties." For example, if the landowner has
plans to utilize the land in the future to generate income, say from
an apartment complex, that future income is not accounted for in
the fair market value.6' No anticipated or unanticipated future
value, unless already a factor in influencing the fair market value,
is compensated.6 '
Thus, if the land has special value to the landowner not
reflected in the market value, the landowner will not be
compensated for this loss in a condemnation.63 Although the law
considers land unique, the theory behind compensation assumes
that by paying the landowner the fair market value for the
condemned land, the landowner can purchase an equally suitable
replacement. This legal doctrine fails to take into account a
landowner's personal experience associated with a particular
property.
For example, if the land had been in the owner's family since
the American Revolution, but had no other significant historical or
locational value to others, the emotional and sentimental loss to
the owner would not be compensated by the fair market value
under the current methods used by courts."4 Land that represents
a special place for a particular group of people, such as holy
ground for an American Indian tribe, would not be considered in
the calculation of the fair market value awarded in a
condemnation action of that land. 6'

57. Id.
58. Id. In addition, the owner may be eligible for compensation based on
"severance damages" in cases where an easement taking causes a diminished
value to the untouched land. Id. § 9.5, at 539 n.1.
59. EPSTEIN, supra note 29, at 182-83.
60. Id. at 183.
61. Id. Epstein points out that the best use of the property lies either in the
owner's hands or in the hands of another individual. Id. In the first instance,
the owner will not be willing to sell at the current market price because by
selling at that price, the owner will be deprived of the surplus value possession
of the property provides him. Id.
62. KNETSCH, supra note 15, at 40.
63. Id. Prevailing practices of compensation do not fully account for the
economic losses suffered when owners are forced to lose the value associated
with their present parcel and that are not regained by purchase of another
parcel. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Linder, supra note 10, at 57 (stating that beauty is ascribed to a
place by the meaning an observer attaches to it). See also Lyng v. Northwest
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Because compensation based on fair market value fails to
anticipate future value and fails to compensate landowners for
personal value associated with the land, fair market value is an
unreliable method of determining the value of an experience in
land use. In addition, the requirement that the land be for public
use lends little help in determining the value of an experience.
While the government can only condemn land for public use, the
definition of "public use" has been liberally construed.66 The
Supreme

Court

in

Hawaii Housing Authority

v.

Midkiff

determined that the definition of "public use" does not require that
the public actually have access to the condemned land.67 The
requirement is that the use be for public benefit. 6 However, the
value of the benefit conferred to the public does not have to
outweigh the benefit taken from the owner.69 Because no
balancing of this kind is required, there is no impetus for any
parties (or for the courts) to value the experience lost by the owner
or gained by the public."0 Because a landowner can simply be
stripped of land if the government deems it necessary for almost
any perceived public benefit, without considering the landowner's
perceived value, public use provides little help in determining the
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 441-42 (1988) (refusing to
block the construction of a roadway on National Forest lands that would
devastate the use of the land by Indian tribes for religious practices).
66. EPSTEIN, supra note 29, at 161 (stating that the question of public use
is an empty one). Epstein quotes the Supreme Court's decision in Parker
stating "the concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive," and
concludes that the power of eminent domain can be used to achieve any end
within Congress's authority. Id. Epstein also notes that the Court advanced
the point in Midkiff by stating "the public use requirement is thus
coterminous with the scope of the sovereign's police powers [and] where the
exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable
public purpose, the court has never held a compensated taking to be
proscribed by the Public Use Clause." Id.
67. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244.
68. Id. at 241.
69. Id.
70. See EPSTEIN, supra note 29, at 183 (stating that market valuation does
not compensate for real values that are subjective.) Market value is the price
a willing buyer will receive from a willing seller. Id. Market price contains a
systematic bias that underestimates the use value of land, which is normally
higher than the market value. Id. This higher use value may reside with
either the current landowner, or with the governmental entity condemning the
property. Id. In cases where the higher use value resides with the current
landowner, the land may be more valuable to the landowner because the
property is customized to fit the owner's particular needs, or gives the
landowner a locational advantage. Id. In a condemnation, the use value to
the government condemning the land may be well above what the use value to
the market represents, so the government is able to compensate the
landowner at a level below the use value to that receiving governmental body.
Id. In either case the landowner losses, because the owner will receive an
amount less than the use value of the land. Id.
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valuation of experiences.
B. Valuation of Regulatory Takings
A regulatory taking occurs when a regulation affecting the
use of private land is deemed to "go too far" and thus requires the
government to compensate the owner for the loss.71 The problems
with the current methods for valuing condemned lands under
eminent domain are also present in regulatory takings. The
compensation ascribed to the value of the taking is the difference
in the value of the land before and after the regulatory taking."2 In
most instances, a regulation is deemed a taking if it deprives the
owner of all economic use of the property."
Depriving the owner of only some of the use of his land can
have one of two general affects upon the landowner. In one
instance, the owner can be deprived of his future plans to utilize
the property.74 In such a case, the owner is not compensated for
his loss of potential future income."
By contrast, in other
instances, the same regulation would literally have no affect on a
landowner. For example, assume an Indian tribe who owns an
area of land. They hold it sacred and are told that they cannot
build apartments on that land. If they had no intentions of
building on the land, they may experience no loss, economic or
otherwise.
These examples illustrat6 that the economic valuation
methods currently used to determine compensation for a
regulatory taking provide little insight into the value of the
owner's experience.
C. Valuation of Regulatory Non-Takings
The general definition of a regulatory non-taking is that the
71. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 12, at 528-29. The famous "too far"
test was the result of the opinion of Justice Holmes in Penn. Coal, 260 U.S. at
393. Id. In Penn. Coal, the coal company challenged the Pennsylvania Kohler
Act that prevented mining of coal near homes. Id. at 529. The Act prohibited

the coal company from making any use of the land where they had already
purchased mining rights, but because of the location of the defendant's house,
actual mining would cause the coal company to violate the Act. Id. The Court
stated "[tihe general rule is that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id. The

opinion gives government regulation a threshold, above which the regulation
is considered a taking. Id.
72. BURKE, supra note 36, at 861.
73. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
74. See Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 137-38 (holding that a city
ordinance preventing the owners of Grand Central Station from renovating
was not a taking because it did not deprive the owners of their investment
backed expectations for the property, and therefore did not require
compensation).

75. Id.
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government, through its police power, has regulated the use of
land for the health, welfare and safety of the public. 6 These
actions do not require compensation to the landowner. 7' The theory
is that the landowner, as a member of the public, is receiving the
benefit of the regulation, just as the rest of the public.7 ' Although
the owner is personally bearing the cost of the regulation, that cost
is offset by the benefit received. 9
However, if a regulation does go too far, it will be deemed a
taking, and will be thrown back into the category of regulation
that must be compensated." Even when the regulation does not
constitute a taking, the regulation must be justified by conferring
a public benefit.8' Although the courts have determined which
factors are to be used in deciding what constitutes a public benefit,
these decisions do not require an evaluation of the public benefit
relative to the value of freedom from regulation. 2 Nor is there any

76. EPSTEIN, supra note 29, at 94. In Penn. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413, the Court
held that the "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law." Id. However, the ability to regulate is limited by
due process. Id. If it is determined by the court that the diminution in value
caused by a regulation is not overwhelming, it is not compensable. Id. at 102.
The harm is said to be damnum absque iniuria, meaning loss for which there
is no legal remedy. Id. For examples of governmental regulations that
prevented the owner from the getting the most beneficial use of their land
without any compensation see Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962) (preventing an owner from removing sand and gravel below a
waterline); and United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958)
(prohibiting the owner of a gold mine from operating the mine). Id. at 103.
77. A TASK FORCE REPORT SPONSORED BY THE ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS

FUND, THE USE OF LAND: A CITIZENS' POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH, 15052 (William K. Reilly, ed. 1973). New York city's Grand Central Terminal was
slated for major renovation as part of a $180 million redevelopment project.
Id. at 150. The plan included construction of a fifty-five story skyscraper in
the space above the terminal. Id. The New York City Landmarks Preservation
Commission sought to prevent the construction based on the premise of
preserving the building. Id. Penn Central brought action in court, claiming
that they were being deprived of millions of dollars in potential income, while
being forced to maintain the building at a deficit. Id. at 151. The Supreme
Court ruled that the city's regulation of the use of the building was not a
taking because it did not deprive the defendant of their investment backed
expectations. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 136. See United Artists'
Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612, 614 (holding that
the designation of a property as historic, without the owner's consent, is not a
taking and thus does not require compensation).
78. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 134-35.
79. Id.

80. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 (1992) (stating that it is a taking when an
owner is deprived of all economic use of a property).
81. See EPSTEIN, supra note 29, at 108-112 (explaining state police power is
utilized for the public good).
82. See id. at 161-62 (discussing cases such as Berman and Midkiff, which
have led legal scholars to conclude that the public use requirement is a non-
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requirement to evaluate the value of the public benefit relative to
the potential public benefit that might occur by not regulating the
private landowner.83
The only real limitation to regulation based on the
governmental police power may be political, rather than one based
on legal limitation. 84 Thus, a regulatory non-taking need not
balance any public benefit against the values associated with
freedom from regulation by the landowner or the public. Therefore,
these cases provide little help in valuation of experiences
associated with land use.
D. Nuisance Law in Valuing Experiences in Land Use
Nuisance law is of some value in helping to preserve
experiences, 5 and it may provide some instructional help in the
valuation of experiences, depending on the type of nuisance
considered. As a preservation tool, for example, nuisance law can
be used to enjoin a neighboring landowner from producing
pollution, which can help preserve the experience of clean rivers,
lakes and oceans.88 However, nuisance law is based on tort
principles, not property principles.87 Nonetheless, factors used to
determine whether a particular activity is or is not a nuisance may
be helpful in valuing the subjective experiences because they
involve the valuation of the tradeoffs between the right of a
landowner to use and enjoy his land against the rights of adjoining
landowners and the public.8
issue with regards to limiting the government's police powers).
83. See id. at 161 (noting that a regulatory non-taking is still limited by the
public use requirement).
84. See HERMAN L. BOSCHKEN, LAND USE CONFLICTS, ORGANIZATIONAL
DESIGN AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, POLITICAL SPHERES AND THE
COMPETITION FOR LAND 3-20 (Univ. of Ill. Press 1982) (describing how
problems in urban growth and governance affect land use regulations).
85. Compare Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 104 (1992) (holding that
federal nuisance law could be used to abate the pollution of interstate
waterways), with United States v. County Bd., 487 F. Supp 137, 141-143
(E.D. Va. 1979) (holding that although the Attorney General has standing to
protect the rights: and properties of the United States, the injunction sought
against the construction of a high-rise in Arlington to prevent visual intrusion
on the area would constitute an over-extension of the police power).
86. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 99.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 (1979). A public nuisance is
defined as "an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general
public." Id. § 821(B) A private nuisance is "a nontrespassory invasion of
another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land." Id. § 821(D).
88. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 12, at 415. Factors in determining
whether a particular activity constitutes a nuisance include: (1) whether the
activity is customarily suited to the area; (2) whether observable effects are
caused by the activity that would be disagreeable to most; (3) whether the
activity could be carried out by a less disturbing method; (4) the value of the
activity to the person performing the activity; (5) the importance of the activity
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E. Land Use Control and Valuation of Experiences
Land use control may provide the most fertile ground for
developing a plausible scheme for pricing experiences. Land use
control involves land allocation based on market forces and
political and administrative governmental actions. 9 Land use
control supports the idea that, in the development of land,
economic
livability is an element that can override
considerations.9" Public policy requires agencies tasked with land
use control to ask questions such as "(1) what are the public needs
and who is affected (2) how are the benefits and costs to be
distributed and (3) how should values be accommodated and
resources allocated."91 These questions give structure to the
strategy pursued by the agency in controlling the use of land.9"
Land use control thus provides valuable insight into the valuation
of an experience because it has been used as a basis to override
economic and traditional property rights, and apply alternative
valuation mechanisms such as evaluation of industrial,
developmental, pastoral, recreational, and human interests in
natural resources. 93
A particularly useful doctrine that may be included under the
category of land use is the Public Trust Doctrine.94 This doctrine
states that the government has the duty to utilize public land to
the benefit of the public.95 Although it has received weak support
in the courts, it has often been invoked in litigation as justification
for aesthetic preservation.9"

III. THE IMPORTANCE OF VALUING AN EXPERIENCE IN LAND
The valuation of subjective experiences associated with land
to society; and (6) whether the activity was begun before the offended parties
arrived. Id.
89. BOSCHKEN, supra note 84, at 3.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 209.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 3.
94. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1954) (holding that "all public
lands of the nation are held in trust for the people of the whole country").
95. Id.
96. See Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d at 590 (explaining that
the state did not have authority to prohibit the erection of an observation
tower near the Gettysburg battlefield under the Public Trust Doctrine). The
opponents of the construction plan argued unsuccessfully that the Public
Trust Doctrine, as incorporated in the state's constitution, gave the state the
authority to regulate or bar the construction because the public would benefit
from the preservation of the battlefield in its current state. Id. But see Sierra
Club v. Dept. of the Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90, 93 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (holding that

the Public Trust Doctrine is applicable in determining whether the Secretary
of the Interior breached his duty to protect Redwood National Park from
lumber company activities).
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and land use, such as scenic beauty and historical significance, are
entangled in an unclear patchwork of legal history. Surely, the
government has the power to condemn property,97 and can regulate
private landowner's use of their property through regulatory
controls such as zoning98 and nuisance law.99 Why then is it
necessary to determine the value of an experience?
One answer is that experiences associated with land use can
be viewed as limited resources that require protection, and the
means of protecting these experiences are limited.'00
The
government has limited funds to purchase land and compensate
landowners for regulatory takings. 0 ' Therefore, the government
must determine how much to allocate for these purposes, and
where and what lands to purchase and regulate."2 Some features,
such as the Grand Canyon, are unique, while other resources, such
as scenic rivers, may exist in various forms throughout the
country. Obviously, the government cannot transport the Grand
Canyon around the country for everyone to share, but it does have
an obligation to distribute parks of some type to all areas of the
country equitably."3 Some method is required to determine where
to apply the limited governmental funds in a manner that will
provide an equitable distribution of the available experiences.""
Regulatory non-takings cost the government nothing directly,
however, they do impose costs on public and private landowners."'
97. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 12, at 525 n.1 (referencing Kohl,

which "established that the Federal Government, in its own right, has the
power to condemn land
..... ).
98. See Vill. of Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 9 (holding a New York village
ordinance restricting the use of land to single-family dwellings constitutional).
99. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 104 (holding that federal nuisance
law could be used to abate the pollution of interstate waterways).
100. See LINDER, supra note 10, at 81 (arguing that public resources should

be used to enrich human lives, and this includes preservation of environments
that are worth experiencing).
101. See id. at 50 (discussing hard choices made due to limited resources).
102. Id. at 50-51. Decisions concerning the allocation of public resources
must be made "by design and not by accident." Id. at 51. As economic
calculations increasingly determine the focus of decision makers, it becomes
more important to direct attention to the preservation of intangibles. Id.

Because of the difficulty in putting a value on these intangibles, there is a
tendency to think of them as unimportant. Id.
103. Id. at 81. More attention needs to be focused on geographically

dispersed areas and smaller places that can enrich people who experience
them, but who may not be able to visit major attractions in remote locations.
Id.
104. Id. at 50.
"The granting of such unbridled discretion invites
arbitrariness." Id. at 51. In order to prevent this, "priorities among criteria
must be established." Id. at 50. It is important to gain an understanding of
why these resources are important for the future because they are being lost
or diminished by development. Id. at 51.
105. See Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124 (stating that whether a
restriction is invalid for failure to compensate a landowner for a resulting loss
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The cost to the landowners may not always be monetary. For
example, regulations to preserve historic areas impose costs on
landowners and the public, while conferring a benefit to the
public.' ° Regulations dictating the use of land already in public
possession involve benefit trade-offs. For example, a regulation
preventing the use of motorized jet skis on waters that have been
designated as scenic rivers takes away the jet skier's experience of
10 7
operating his or her equipment on that body of water.
Regulations prohibiting overflights of the Grand Canyon take
away a person's chance to experience the Grand Canyon from
above.'08
In the case of a bridge spanning a river providing access to a
national park, the conflicting interests of public access, public
safety, use of the river, historic preservation, environmental harm
and aesthetics all weigh into the decisions of whether to build the
bridge, and where and how it should be constructed.'0 9 Without a
method to value experiences, these conflicts may not be resolved in
a manner that best serves the public good."
Lack of valuation
could result in an ad hoc policy application."' Experiences that
are not recognized may be lost completely." 2 Failure to recognize
is determined on a case by case basis). The Court stated that it has been
unable to develop a formula for determining "justice and fairness" when
economic injuries are "disproportionately concentrated on a few persons." Id.
106. See David B. Fein, Note, Historic Districts: Preserving City
Neighborhoods for the Privileged, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 64, 68 (1985) (arguing
that historic preservation laws have displaced minorities and the poor from
urban neighborhoods).
107. See Hells Canyon Alliance, at 1173-74 (proposing Alternative G as part
of a Recreational Management Plan that would ban the use of motorized
watercraft in certain areas of Hells Canyon on particular days during the
summer).
108. See Grand Canyon Air, 154 F.3d at 459 (litigating objections from the
Grand Canyon Air Tour Coalition and others concerning the FAA's final rule
covering overflights of Grand Canyon National Park).
109. Coalitionfor Canyon Pres., 788 F. Supp at 1523-27 (evaluating whether
the Federal Highway Administration, the Army Corps of Engineers, and a
private contractor constructing a bridge, violated the Clean Water Act, the
National Environmental and Policy Act, and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act).
110. See BOSCHKEN, supra note 84, at 3-5 (discussing how renewed interest
in land ethics can overrule the utilitarian value, or economic rule). Urban
expansion and the changes in metropolitan processes have caused an increase
in land prices along with greater competition among land users. Id. at 3.
Competing interests of industrial, developmental, pastoral, recreational, and
natural resources have created a renewed emphasis for land use planning. Id.
The central theme of land use control is to make sure that the administrative
process works to provide public policies that suitably allocate resources to
competing interests). Id. at 19.
111. Linder, supra note 10, at 50-51. (stating that variations caused by a
lack of principled decision making will generate arbitrariness).
112. A TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 77, at 103. North Carolinians
observed that the English countryside seems more spacious than that of rural
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the value of an experience may not result in loss, but may result in
high recovery costs once the value has been recognized. 113 Without
method of valuation, the rich and influential may obtain a
disproportionate amount of experiences, leaving the poor or less
influential public without access to these experiences.'
Public

North Carolina, while England and Wales are approximately the same size as
North Carolina, but have nine times North Carolina's population. Id. The
author attributes this to Britain's active protection of open space, not viewing
such space as mere voids in urbanization yet to be developed. Id. See Lisa
Healy, Trophy Homes and Other Alpine Predators:The Protectionof Mountain
Views Through Ridge Line Zoning, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 913, 935
(1998) (noting that North Carolina passed the Mountain Ridge Protection Act
(Ridge Act) in 1993). North Carolina was the nation's first state to pass
comprehensive legislation regulating mountain ridge construction. Id. The
act was in response to out-of-state developers commencing construction of a
condominium complex on the peak of Little Sugar Mountain. Id. The act was
passed by the North Carolina General Assembly imposing height limitations
of construction within one hundred feet of a mountain's crest line. Id. The act
gives local government flexibility in enforcing the act, and provides the
opportunity for a county or city to exempt itself through a binding referendum,
and to opt back into regulation under the act, again by referendum. Id. at 936.
113. Consider the cost of restoring St. Louis to its 1804 dress, mentioned in
this Comment's opening hypothetical. For example, the government would
most likely have to condemn, through its powers of eminent domain, the entire
area within the city limits of St. Louis. This is necessary because more likely
than not, none of the buildings currently in the city existed in 1804, and thus
will have to be demolished and replaced with replicas of the buildings that
existed in 1804. A court is likely to rule that this act in effect leaves the
landowner, even if he or she were allowed to retain ownership of the land,
without any economically viable means of utilizing the land. In other words, if
a particular parcel of land that now has an apartment complex on it was
simply woodland in 1804, the owner would be forced to demolish the
apartment building and then plant native species of trees on the lot. The
action would most likely be considered a taking, and would require
compensation to the landowners at the fair market value of the land. It is
unlikely that any government, especially not a local or state government,
could afford the cost of purchasing a city the size of St. Louis. In addition to
these direct expenses, the removal of the buildings, other structures such as
airports, train tracks, paved roadways, telephone and other communication
devices such as cell phone towers, would result in almost a complete loss of the
employment within the area, and a resultant loss to the city's tax base.
114. See FEIN, supra note 106, at 68 (discussing the adverse consequences of
zoning and governmental responses). Following World War II, a migration
from urban areas to the suburbs resulted in municipalities amending their
zoning laws in an effort to preserve a certain quality of life. Id. Amendments
included requirements for larger lot sizes, restrictions on the number of
building permits to be issued, and bans on mobile homes, apartments and row
houses.
Id. This type of zoning is called exclusionary zoning.
Id.
Exclusionary zoning leads to minorities and the poor being trapped in
deteriorating urban neighborhoods, generally denying them access to
employment, housing and educational opportunities equal to the suburban
residents. Id. Judiciary scrutiny of these ordinances has increased, but most
states have upheld exclusionary zoning. Id. at 68-69. In Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed,
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pressure for economic growth in a particular geographic area could
result in the public being deprived of experiences in that
geographic area."5
The potential for loss of experiences and the potential for
abuse in allocating these experiences to the public in an equitable
fashion are strong reasons for developing a system of valuing
experiences. Thus, the existing benefit analysis philosophies used
to determine policy must be re-examined and utilized in a different
form to more effectively and fairly value an experience.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS FOR VALUATION OF EXPERIENCES

A. Declarationof Policy and Purpose
As a starting point, a policy to be used in guiding legislation
or acts of Congress relating to land use should be enunciated.
Such a policy statement would serve at least two important
functions. First, a policy statement would give clear direction to
parties attempting to implement any legislation enacted in
pursuance of experience valuation. This is extremely helpful when
federal, state, or local governments are making implementation
decisions of how best to draft the legislation. Second, a policy
statement will bring about a general awareness concerning the
problems associated with valuating experiences. As pointed out
previously, one of the problems with experiences associated with
land use is that, because they represent subjective material, they
are not easily recognized and may be viewed as too difficult to

423 U.S. 808 (1975), the New Jersey Supreme Court held as unconstitutional a
municipal zoning ordinance restricting residential construction to lots of one
acre minimum and limited to single family homes. FEIN, supra note 106, at 7071. The court held that Mount Laurel must provide fair share housing. Id. at
71. Other types of zoning, such as historic preservation, have the positive
benefits of enhanced general public welfare, educational opportunities,
cultural opportunities, and encourages tourism and reinvestment. Id. at 70.
Historic preservation can also displace and exclude minorities and the poor
from these neighborhoods. Id.
These consequences can outweigh the
contributions of the preservation ordinances. Id. Contrast Vill. of Belle Terre,
416 U.S. at 9 (holding a city ordinance restricting land use to one family
dwellings constitutional). The court held that "[a] quiet place where yards are
wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a
land-use project addressed to family needs." Id. The police power can be used
to create zones where family and youth values, and quiet seclusion and clean
air provide a sanctuary for people. See id. (quoting Berman in holding that it
was within the power of the legislature to determine that a community should
be beautiful, healthy, spacious and clean).
115. Richard Brooks & Peter Lavigne, Aesthetic Theory and Landscape
Protection: The Many Meanings of Beauty and Their Implication for the
Design, Control and Protection of Vermont's Landscape, 4 UCLA J. ENVTL. &
POL'Y 129, 135 (1985).
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regulate." 6
A policy statement should include a general definition of what
subject matter an experience associated with land use might
entail. The policy should include a statement that experiences, as
defined by statutes or other regulations, are a valuable and limited
resource to both private landowners and to the public. The policy
statement should include language to the effect that, as valuable
resources, experiences should be preserved and protected by
means deemed appropriate to serve the interests of both the public
and private landowners.
A policy statement should also include language making clear
the government's obligation to determine what the current and
future needs of the public are, and its obligation to determine a
course of action for creation, preservation and allocation of the
resources that can satisfy those needs. The allocation of these
experience resources must be made in a manner that serves the
best interest of the public, and does not favor or discriminate
against specific geographic, demographic or other particular
groups or classes of individuals.
B. GatherInformation ConcerningExperiences
Because the government has many agencies that collect and
analyze a myriad of data, this power should be harnessed to collect
and review information concerning experiences. The purpose of
such an exercise would be to determine what experiences currently
exist, where they exist, and how they are being supplied to the
pubic, whether through governmental programs such as the
National Park Service or through state, local, or private means.
The results of such a survey can be used to determine where
experience gaps exist. For example, a determination may be made
that a particular geographic area lacks open spaces or parks
within a reasonable distance of a large residential population.
116. See LINDER, supra note 10, at 81 (contending that even the recent shift
in governmental policies geared toward economic efficiency in land use to
maximizing ecological integrity does little to enrich human experiences).
Linder contends that there are at least four divergent notions of criteria that
should be applied to public decisions related to preservation. Id. at 50. These
include: preserving areas with the greatest visual beauty; preserving areas
that preserve cultural stability; preserving areas that protect and stabilize
ecosystems; and preserving areas that offer the potential for experiences
promoting moral or intellectual growth. Id.
Simply giving policy makers a list of factors to consider when
developing priorities among these criteria will result in arbitrary decisions,
depending on which particular approach the policy maker's favor. Id. at 50-51.
In order for appropriate preservation decisions to be made, it must come about
by design and not accident. Id. at 51. Because society increasingly favors
hard-edged decisions based on economics, it has become easier for people to
believe that intangible resources, such as experiences that enrich human lives,
are unimportant or unreal. Id.
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Applicable information can accurately be gathered by finding
answers to the following questions:
*

What constitutes an experience?

*

What experiences are valuable to the public?

*

Are these experiences in existence now; if so, where
are they, in what quantities, how distributed, and are
they in danger of being lost or destroyed? and

*

What experiences need to be created in the future,
including ones that the public may not currently be
aware of the need for or the existence of?

The federal government need not attempt to accomplish this
task on its own. It can share and delegate tasks to the states,
which in turn can delegate all or part of their assignments to local
and regional committees. This not only eases the burden on
federal resources, but has the additional benefit of adding local
knowledge and flavor to the collected information. The addition of
state and local entities will ensure that local interests and needs
are included in the accounting. Special interest groups, such as
historical preservation societies, organizations promoting art and
music, wildlife preservation, and other land use concerns would
provide invaluable input, and should be solicited at all levels.
The goal is to assess the overall current status and projected
future needs of the public with regard to land use experiences.
This should involve as many diverse opinions and viewpoints as
possible. " 7
The government then needs to develop a system for valuing
these experiences. The system should not be based on economic
factors alone, but can be based on a quantifiable value system,
such as a score value.118
The score value can be determined by assigning a weighted
value to each factor in a set of factors relevant to an experience. A
simple numerical value, say on a scale of one to ten, could be
117. See Brooks & Lavigne, supra note 115, at 172 n.203 (stating that
decision making boards should solicit inputs from a cross section of sources,
including naturalists, social historians, political representatives and

scientists).
118. See id. at 146-47 (discussing the use of a scale score to determine the
relative value of views). A scale was developed by using a panel of expert
observers to evaluate twenty landscape views from various parts of the world.
Id. The panel developed a numerical range of scores, from zero to thirty-two,
based on the view's overall beauty. Id. at 147. An alternative method, which
purportedly overcomes some of the deficiencies of the scale system, was
developed in order to evaluate the features of a landscape that most contribute
to its quality. Id. The alternative system assigns weights to the attributes of
a landscape according to the attribute's perceived importance, and then
combines these weights to develop a map of the results. Id.
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assigned to represent the relative strength or weakness of that
particular factor with regards to an experience. For example, with
regards to uniqueness, consider the Grand Canyon compared to a
patch of green grass. The Grand Canyon might be assigned a value
of ten, while the patch of green grass might be assigned a value of
one. Guidelines could be developed for each factor to aid in the
determination of the value of an experience.
Some suggested factors for consideration might include:
uniqueness of the experience, 119 ease in creating the experience,"'0
available alternatives to the experience (both public and
private), 2' quality and proximity of these alternative experiences,
and who may be burdened by a condemnation or regulation
regarding the experience, weighed against who is benefited.
Once a score value has been determined for a particular
experience, that value can then be used to make rational decisions
concerning regulations. For example, in Grand CanyonAir, trying
to determine the value of quiet solitude while visiting the Canyon,
a high score for the uniqueness factor adds weight to the side of
the argument against allowing airplane overflights, based on the
inability to duplicate the experience through alternative means.'2 2
This system still requires making decisions based on matters
of a subjective nature, but the decisions can be made and justified
on a basis of equitable allocation of the experience resources.
There is no question that this process still involves hard choices."2

119. For example, the Grand Canyon would be considered relatively unique
as compared to an open area of green grass.
120. Again using the Grand Canyon versus a patch of green grass example,
it would be literally impossible to recreate the Grand Canyon, say in
Maryland, but it might be relatively simple to create an area of green grass,
even in the parched desert, through the use of irrigation.
121. The contention is that the private sector can provide amusement parks,
art museums and other entities that may be considered equivalent substitutes
for land uses that would have to be paid for by government funding. When the
private sector supplies these experiences, it preserves government funds for
other, less fungible land use projects. It could also reduce the need for
governmental condemnation and regulation, thus reducing the burden on
private land owners. Also, technology can be used as a substitute for an
experience. For example, a big screen movie experience of flying over the
Grand Canyon might provide an acceptable substitute for an actual overflight
of the Grand Canyon. This factor, available alternatives, would require
evaluation of both distribution of the alternatives, such as driving or walking
distance from a given population, and a determination of what constitutes an
alternative. Questions like "Is a public aquarium an alternative to a outdoor
public park?" would still have to be addressed.
122. Grand Canyon Air, 154 F.3d at 460 (stating that the FAA promulgated
these regulations because of safety concerns and "because it believed that
there is also a public interest in promoting a quiet environment in the canyon
and minimizing the intrusion of aircraft noise on this environment .... ").
123. See Linder, supra note 10, at 50 (illustrating the difficulty in this
decision making process).
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That may be one reasons the current law fails to adequately
address these issues.
Although the suggestions presented here require more
informational input and difficult decisions on subjective issues, the
process can and is currently being done by many government
agencies.12
Even the courts have begun to favor using more
subjective tests
in an effort to achieve equitable solutions to land
1
use control. '
Valuations based on matters of a subjective nature are
difficult to make, but these hard choices are going to be made with
or without government direction and intervention. Private land
owners are going to erect billboards, build apartment complexes,
cut trees, and destroy wildlife habitats. Without some controls,
individuals or groups will be allowed to exploit land for personal
fortune at the expense of destroying, perhaps permanently, the
land use experiences of other individuals or groups.
CONCLUSION

As the United States becomes more sophisticated and
developed, preservation of subjective issues, such as experiences
associated with land use, becomes more important."6
These
experiences are valuable and limited resource that require legal
recognition, and a requisite level of legal protection. The subjective
nature of land use experiences has precluded the legal system
from dealing with the issue on an in-depth basis, in many
instances allowing simple economic and market factors to
determine the relative values of various experiences. 7
This Comment has suggested how to combine aspects from
different areas of the law in order to develop a system for
valuation of land use experiences. In order to be effective, changes
124. See Coalition for Canyon Pres., 788 F. Supp at 1523 (forcing the
National Park Service to balance many competing interests regarding the
construction of a bridge); Grand Canyon Air, 154 F.3d at 459 (forcing the FAA
to promulgate regulations concerning overflights of the Grand Canyon, taking
into account the interests of the public, local commercial air plane tour
companies, and a resident Indian tribe).
125. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (holding that for
an ordinance requiring an exaction from a private landowner, there must be a
rough proportionality determination made to ensure that there is a reasonable
relationship between the exaction and the impact of the proposed development
for which the landowner seeks a permit). For example, in exactions, the
government requires a nexus between the exaction required and the public
benefit. Id. at 386.
126. See BROOKS & LAVIGNE, supra note 115, at 129-30 (stating that

presently, the system does not protect our nation's environmental beauty, and
that a coherent, rational system needs to be put into place in order to direct
the changes caused by economic and ecological forces that impact the present
and future beauty of the landscape).
127. See id. (illustrating the growing importance of land preservation).
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and additions to regulation of land use must be made based on a
cross-sectional gathering of information and intelligent use of that
information to develop regulations based on a well thought out
policy statement. These decisions can then be made in an
equitable manner designed to best utilize a valuable and limited
resource: the experience associated with land use.

